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1 INTRODUCTION 
The  creation  of the  European  Economic  Area  (EEA),  i.e.  the  free  trade  area 
between the  EFTA- and  the  EC-countries  might  be  considered  as  a  first  step 
towards  closer  relations  between  the  countries  of the  two  blocks.  Before  the 
negotiations  came  to  an  end,  Austria,  Sweden,  Finland  and  Switzerland1  had 
already applied for membership to the EC. Norway joined the other in November 
1992.  Responding  to  these  initiatives  the  European  Council  decided  in  the 
Edinburgh summit "that enlargement negotiations will start with Austria, Sweden 
and Finland at the beginning of 1993".  Moreover,  the European Council invited 
the Council of Ministers to "take decisions on the opening of negotiations on the 
same basis with Norway as soon as the Commission's opinion on its application is 
available". 
Following  the  indications  of the  European  Council  the  present  study  confines 
Austria and the three Nordic countries (EFTA(4) for short).  It purports to give a 
short presentation of these economies, emphasising more the aspects that have a 
bearing on the costs, the benefits and the risks  of the prospective integration of 
these  economies  with the  existing  EC.  The  review  is  also  marked  by another 
statement of the  European Council  at the  Edinburgh  summit,  namely that "the 
conditions of admission will be based on the acceptance in full of the Treaty on 
European Union". It means that the Maastricht treaty forms the guide-line for the 
enlargement assessments. 
Basic data about these countries in panel  1 suggest that the  EFTA(  4)  countries 
belong  to  the  group  of the  most  prosperous  and  privileged  countries  in  the 
industrial  world.  Using  conventional  criteria,  one  can  easily  anticipate  that 
inclusion of these countries to the  EC will invigorate the industrial basis of the 
Community and enhance its  economic  importance.  This  is  not the  central issue 
however, because the mutual benefits of  an enlarged free trade region or a customs 
union  are  already  ensured  by  the  EEA  treaty.  What  makes  this  particular 
enlargement unique is that it will occur during the ongoing transformation of the 
Community to an economic and monetary union, the EMU.  One consequence of 
the  delicate  nature  of this  evolution,  is  that  candidates  will  have  to  meet 
requirements  that  go  far  beyond  those  for  participation  in the  internal  market 
alone. 
The declared ambition of  the governments of  the EFTA(  4) countries is to join the 
EC  in the  middle  of the  1990's.  Asswning that the  time  schedule  holds,  the 
enlargement will  occur at the  critical  stage  II  of the  EMU,  a  stage  at which 
economic convergence has proceeded to a degree that ensures irrevocable fixing 
of exchange rates without any credibility problems.  This imperative may entail 
several restrictions on policy priorities in the short and medium term, in the sense 
that intermediate targets which are  not conducive  to  the  principal  objective  of 
reducing  the  importance  of exchange  rates  as  a  policy  instrument  have  to  be 
subordinated to this. Otherwise, there is a risk of  inconsistence between short-
1 The EEA-traty was rejected by the Swiss people in a referendum in early December 1992. -2-
PANEL 1: Basic Data about the EFTA{4} Countries 
Austria  Finland  Norwar..  Sweden 
Area (1000 sq.km)  84  338  324  450 
Population (1000)  7718  4997  4249  8591 
Currency  Schilling  Markka  Krone  Krona 
GOP/capita; US $ (1989)  16603  23270  21341  22360 
Linked to  Floating  Floating  Floating 
Exchange rate regime  Deutche  since  since  since 
Mark  9/9-92  10112-92  19111-92 
Industrial ori&i!! of 
GDP, 1990 (per cent) 
Agriculture  3  7,5  2:J  3,7 
Industry  27  24,8  21,8  29 
Construction  7  9,1  5,6  9,9 
Services  63  58,6  55,3  57,4 
Oil  14,4 
Gross fixed Capital 
Formation in 1990,  24,7  26,9  19,3  20,7 
per cent of GDP 
Government (1989) 
Public Consumption  18,2  21  21  27,2 
(per cent of  GDP) 
General Government  48,6  38,2  54,6  59,9 
Outlays 
(per cent ofGDP)1) 
(38,2)*  (30,5)*  (41,4)*  (43,3)* 
General Government  45,8  39,8  54,9  64,2 
Revenues  (39,4)*  (34,1)*  (43,3)*  (46,6)* 
(per cent of  GDP)l> 
Taxation (1991) 
Tax brackets for  10-SO  17-55  30-48,8  30-50 
perso~  incpme 
.·;;·_,.,  ',.,  -;  .... 
(lowest - bi&hest)  ·· 
Capital income  30  25  28  30 
Corporate taxes  30  25  28  30 
V.A.T. 3)  20  22  20  25 
1) EC average was 47,8 in 1989 and 36,9 in 1970. 
2) EC average was 44,1 in 1989 and 36,5 in 1970. 
*  the numbers in brackets refer to the corresponding shares in 1970. 
3) EC average was 15 per cent in 1991. 
Sources: OECD Economic Surveys: Austria 1991/1992; Finland 1990/1991; Sweden 1991/1992; Switzerland 
1990/1991. Some figures have been revised by national authorities. -3-
and long-term priorities, if  countries try to overcome current difficulties by using 
instruments that have to be removed in the future.  This aspect has become par-
ticularly important for the Nordic countries, especially after their commitments to 
keep fixed exchange rates vis-a-vis the ECU succumbed to market pressure in late 
1992. 
Consequently, the following brief  review of  the EFTA{  4) countries highlights eco-
nomic and policy aspects from this particular angle.  A minimum set of criteria 
concerning nominal  convergence  are  specified in the  Maastricht treaty,  which 
gives them the status of necessary conditions for participation in the EMU. The 
medium-term possibilities for the EFTA(  4) countries to meet these requirements 
are examined in the third section. The economic links between the EFTA(  4) and 
the Community constitute another relevant aspect, and are reviewed in the next 
section. Extensive trade relations, especially on inter-industry basis and with well-
diversified products,  reduce  the  probability of ·so  called asymmetric  shocks  to 
occur, which in tum makes it easier to formulate a common monetary policy in 
stage  m of the  EMU.  Finally,  microeconomic  performance  and  the  overall 
functioning of domestic markets are discussed (fourth section). These aspects are 
crucial for nominal flexibility and relative competitiveness in the long-run,  the 
most essential determinants of  the real costs of  participation in a monetary union. 
The basic conclusions from this review can be summarised the following way: The 
performance of the Austrian and Norwegian economies  suggest that these two 
countries easily can achieve nominal convergence by 1995.Finland and Sweden 
however,  suffer from  obvious  difficulties  to  cope with their fiscal  imbalances. 
Moreover, weak intra-industry trade linkages between the Community and Finland 
and Norway suggest  also  that these  economies  are  more  exposed to  risks  for 
asymmetric shocks than the other two countries. The prolonged crises in these two 
economies,  precipitated by the sharp fall  in oil prices  in  1986  (in the  case of 
Norway)  and the  collapse of the  trade  with the  former  USSR (in the  case of 
Finland)  verify  to  some  extent  this  supposition.  At last,  malfunctioning  and 
heavily regulated  domestic  markets  hint  at grave  nominal  rigidities  in  all  the 
EFTA(  4) countries. Thus, even if  the EFT  A(  4) countries have a good reputation as 
well  performing  economies  fostering  prosperity  and welfare,  several  problems 
have to find their solution before the move  to join  the EMU can be made at low  ' 
real costs. -4-
2 ECONOMIC LINKS BETWEEN THE EFTA(4) AND THE EC 
2.1 Trade Relations 
As shown in table  1, the EFTA(  4) economies have developed strong commercial 
links with the  EC.  This can be partly explained by the  20-years old free-trade 
agreement between EFTA and EC,  but also by a purposeful participation in the 
international division of  labour. Finland's slightly lower degree of  integration with 
the EC-market reflects the extensive trade this country developed with the former 
USSR, based on special political relations and preferential treatment. 
The most important message of  table 1 is that the trade with the Community by far 
constitutes the largest external source of income, consumption and investment for 
each one of the EFTA(  4) countries.  On average,  around three quarters of these 
countries' external trade takes place within the enlarged EC area, and this share is 
expected to increase as  a result of the new EFTA-EC treaty, which goes further 
than the  previous  one  especially  in the  liberalization  of the  trade  in  services. 
Moreover,  Austria and Sweden have not only become more open during the two 
last  decades,  but also  exhibit a  high  degree  of intra-industry  integration.  This 
feature makes these economies less vulnerable to  asymmetric  shocks,  as branch 
shocks will afflict the entire Community symmetrically and can therefore be met 
by common policies. This is of great importance for economies participating in a 
monetary  union.  In this  respect,  conditions  in  Finland  and  Norway  are  less 
favourable (see table 1  ). 
Finland 
The degree of openness of Finland is notably lower than the others' and has been 
trending downwards (table 1). The latter indicates that the relatively rapid growth 
of the  Finnish  economy  (table  2)  was  based  on  a  strong  domestic  demand. 
Moreover, a closer look on the export side reveals two important characteristics: 
First,  there  is  a  dominating  sector,  as  the  vecy  special  wood,  pulp  and paper 
industry stands for more than one third  of total Finnish exports.  Second, one of 
the  most  important  export  markets  up  to  1990  was  the  former  Soviet  Union. 
Around 15 per cent of total exports were directed to USSR under a quite special 
barter regime, with the Finnish government acting as an intermediary. 
The former Soviet Union was an important market for many Finnish industries. 
About a quarter of  textiles and engineering and over a third of the food industries 
were exported to USSR (up to  1990).  Supported by a comprehensive system of 
state  guarantees  and  with  oil  products  to  balance  the  trade  account,  Finnish 
exporters  enjoyed quite  favourable  trade  conditions.  There  is  evidence that the 
price  of exports  were  around ten per cent above  world  market  prices  and  the 
markets  were  secured  by  quotas.  Moreover,  this  trade  shielded  the  Finnish 
economy from the oil-price shocks in the 1970s and early 1980s. -5-
Tabte 1: The size and the structure of the external sector
Eryorts as o percentage
of GDP
Imports ut o percentage
of GDP
Share of intra-
industm trade
with th; ELu)
Austria
Finland
Norway
Sweden
1970  1990
31,2  46,1
27,4  22,6
41,9  M,4
24,4  29,9
1970  1990
30,1  39,9
28,8  24,1
43,2  36,7
24,9  30,3
t987
0,68
0,39
0,36
0,70
al fne Aegrce of inter-industry trade is meanrred  by the Gnrbel-Lloyd  coefficient.  This is
Il'l -^rl
t -  t 
. , where ri and nf, denote the expors and imports of good k by country i, respectively.
h
The closer this coefficient  is to l, the grater is the share of infa-industry trade.
Sources: OECD Economic Ortlook 51, June 1992; and'Effects  of 1992 on the Ndanufactruing Industries of
the EFTA Countries', EFTA Oocasional  paper no 38.
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On the other hand,  such a concentration of exports on an economically fragile 
market implied substantial risks. This became clear in the beginning of 1991 when 
this trade collapsed, imparting a tremendous shock to the Finnish economy. Over 
two thirds of these exports disappeared in 1991 which, together with the cyclical 
weakness in other export markets, yielded a fall in the value of  total exports of 8,6 
per cent.  The shrinkage of the exports had of course rapid repercussions to the 
entire economy, as investment fell by 17 per cent, output by 6,1  per cent and the 
unemployment rate doubled, to reach the level of 7,6 per cent in 1991. After this 
shock,  an important question is whether the capital stock used for that trade is 
modem  enough  to  allow  a  sustainable  diversion  of exports  to  other,  more 
competitive  markets.  The  two  recent  devaluations  of  the  markka2  have 
nevertheless given a  push to Finnish exports during  1992,  but this  policy also 
entails  the  risk that the  provided  relief weakens  the  incentives  for  necessary 
structural changes, to the extent such changes are necessary. 
The  heavy  reliance  on  wood,  pulp  and  paper  constitutes  another  sotirce  of 
concern.  This  industry is  concentrated to few  countries  (Sweden,  Finland  and 
Canada are  among the  big producers),  and  it uses  extremely  capital-intensive 
technology.  The  high  proportion  of fixed  capital  makes  the  sector  extremely 
inflexible,  as the  supply side cannot respond to fluctuations  in world demand. 
Thus,  cyclical fluctuations  in demand give rise  to  sharp fluctuations  in prices, 
which in turn are transmitted to the tenns of trade.  On top of this,  there is an 
additional factor which usually tends to magnify the demand-price effect, namely 
the dollar effect3• Generally, the dollar becomes weak during recessions, because 
of the monetary loosening in U.S.A., and recovers during the economic upturns. 
Thus, there are two mutually reinforcing factors that affect the profitability of this 
important  sector  during  a  business  cycle,  making  the  Finnish  economy  more 
exposed  to  cyclical  variations  in  world  trade  than  European  economies  on 
average4•  This  is,  of course,  a  structural  weakness  of the  Finnish  economy, 
explaining also the frequent use of  the exchange rate as a policy instrument. 
Norway 
The composition of exports, with oil and gas amounting to 42 percent of total in 
1990, makes even Norway a special case. The rapid expansion of the oil sector 
since late 1960s secured a substantial annual income, but has also contributed to a 
gradual displacement of other industrial activities, as a strong real wage develop-
ment made traditional branches  less profitable.  This  feature  explains  the  poor 
intra-industry integration with the EC, shown in table 1. 
The dominance of  oil exports entails exchange rate problems similar to the above 
mentioned in the case of Finland. Contrary to the economies of the Community, 
oil price increases favour the total Norwegian economy and fluctuations  in the 
dollar exert a strong impact on the terms of  trade. Moreover, profitability in the oil 
2 By 12 per cent in November 1991 and  by another 11 per cent in September 1992, the latter in connection 
with the floating of  the markka (graph 4). 
3  Dollar is the vehicle currency for the world trade in these products. 
4 This is true even for Sweden to some extent, where the value of wood, pulp and paper exports amounts to 
around 18 per cent of  the total. -7-
sector goes in the opposite direction with the rest of the economy, the so called 
mainland economy, for several reasons. First, when the world trade suffers from 
increases in oil prices the export industry looses export possibilities. Second, by 
keeping factor demand and factor prices high even when the export industry is 
weak.  Third,  by allowing  more  expansionary  policies,  since  extra  oil-income 
compensates  for  higher  imports.  All  these  effects  imply  that  high  oil  prices 
contribute to shifting resources from the exposed mainland sector to the oil and the 
sheltered mainland sectors. 
2.2 Cyclical Synchronization between the EFTA(  4) and the Community 
It is self-evident that common monetary policy is easier to agree upon if income 
developments  in  the  participating  countries  are  in phase  during  the  business 
cycles. In case they are not, monetary loosening can stimulate real activity in some 
of  them while boosting inflation in others. Similarly, monetary tightening designed 
to restrain inflationary tendencies in some countries can lead to deep recession in 
others. Strong economic links improve the synchronization of output and income 
moves,  but this  is  not sufficient as  deviating  economic policies  can distort  an 
otherwise good underlying synchronization. 
Table 2,  provides a simple measure of cyclical covariability.  The table( contains 
both the existing EC and the OECD-Europe, the latter as a proxy for the enlarged 
Community.  As it can easily be  seen,  with  exception  of Austria,  the  cyclical 
sychronization of the three Nordic countries and the Community with respect to 
real income is rather weak. However, this impression disappears if  we look at the 
interrelation between nominal  incomes.  Apparently,  a  problem of intepretation 
emerges'. 
Table 2: Cyclical Covariability between the EFTA(4) and the Community 
Real GDP Correlations  Nominal GDP Correlations 
OECD-Euro~  EC  OECD-Europe  EC 
Austria  0,72  0,72  0,68  0,67 
Finland  0,47  0,41  0,72  0,68 
Norway  0,24  0,21  0,77  0,74 
Sweden  0,34  0,29  0,65  0,66 
Calculations of  correlation indeces based on OECD data for the period 1972-1991. The correlation indeces 
measure the degree of  synchronization in cyclical income moves. A high covariability index (close to 1) 
indicates that income developments are in phase, i.e. they follow closely each other during a business cycle. 
Bad correspondence in real incomes with parallel moves in nominal incomes sug-
gests that even the difference between them, the inflation rate, has followed differ-
ent time paths. It also means that the Nordic countries have followed stabilization 
' Changes in the choosen period affect the measures quantitatively whithout affecting the message. -8-
policies which have been at variance with the average policy stance of the Com-
munity, and this is probably the main explanation of  the observed paradox. 
It is well-known that the Nordic  countries  have  been very  reluctant to  accept 
strong fluctuations in unemployment, without showing a similar aversion against 
inflation (graph 7). Economic policies have therefore been based on the ambition 
to  smoothen  nominal  income.  One  problem  with  systematic  smoothening  of 
nominal income is that economic policy becomes predictable, which generally has 
a negative feed-back effect on the behaviour of  the private sector. This can happen 
because easily anticipated accommodating measures, like devaluations or income 
injections  through  increased  public  spending,  make  the  private  sector  less 
responsive to external impulses. For example, when trade with the EC weakens, 
private firms in the considered countries may not respond by cutting production or 
releasing labour to the extent it is motivated by the economic conjuncture, because 
they expect stimulative measures. This behaviour has been observed in the Nordic 
countries. 
Moreover, the public sector has been used as a cushion against cyclical unemploy-
ment, at least Sweden and Norway, creating this way severe structural problems. 
Public sector expansions during recessions were not followed by commensurate 
contractions during booms. Instead, taxes were increased in order to fmance the 
enhanced public activities. The accumulative effect of this kind of policies led to 
continuous augmentation of  the public sectors (see panell) and, as it is expected, 
the  total  economy  has  become  more  subjected  to  political  decisions  than  to 
external conditions. 
To the extent the observed peculiarity in table 2 can be explained by deviating 
trade patterns and odd economic policies, there are several indications that things 
can improve  in the immediate future.  First,  a  structural  shift in the underlying 
preferences with respect to inflation and unemployment seems to be under way, 
indicated in graph 7 (b-d). Second, plans for scaling down the public sectors have 
been announced. Third, ongoing efforts to direct more of  the Finnish trade towards 
the  European economies looks  promising,  so  far.  Fourth,  economic policies in 
Norway are currently not based on total, but on the mainland economy.  Finally, 
the new treaty between EFTA and the Community improves the conditions for 
enhanced trade relations comparing with the old one, e.g in the area of services. 
Besides, the technologically advanced industrial basis of these countries provides 
sufficient flexibility and adaptability to new policy environments. -9-
3 NOMINAL CONVERGENCE IN THE SHORT- AND MEDIUM- TERM 
Moving to the nominal convergence criteria set out in the Maastricht treaty, we can 
see  from  table  3  that inflation is  currently a  minor problem for  all  the  EFTA(  4) 
countries. The subsiding inflation had reached quite low levels in 1992, which can be 
explained mostly by price stability oriented economic policies than by the recession. 
The recent depreciations of  the currencies of  the Nordic countries gave 
Table 3: Convergence requirements (1991-1993) 
Gen. Gov. Balance  Public Debt  Long-term interest 
Inflation  in %ofGDP  in% ofGDP  rates 
1991  1992  1993  1991  1992  1993  1991  1992  1993  1991  1992  1993 
Austria  3,3  4,0  3,5  -2,3  -1,9  -2,1  56,7  55,4  55,2  8,6  8,4 
Finland  5,4  3,5  3,5  -6,0  -8,9  -7,7  21,4  37,1  47,1  12,2  12,8 
Norway  3,7  2,4  5,2  -0,5  -3,0  -3,2  39,9  45,1  50,1  9,9  9,8 
Sweden  10,2  2,8  5,3  -1,5  -9,0  -12,0  55,0  65,8  75,0  10,9  10,2 
EMU-crit  4,4  4,0  3,8  3,0  3,0  3,0  60,0  60,0  60,0  11,9  12,5 
Memorandum items 
Real GDP growth  Unemployment rates Current Account 
balances (o/o of GDP) 
1980- 1992  1993  1980- 1992  1993  1980- 1992  1993 
1991  1991  1991 
Austria  2,3  2,0  2,0  3,2  3,8  4,3  -0,2  0,4  0,1 
Finland  2,5  -2,0  2,0  5,0  12,8  13,2  -2,5  -4,1  -1,8 
Norway  2,6  2,6  1,0  3,2  5,9  6,1  1,2  2,7  2,8 
Sweden  1,6  -1,6  -1,6  2,1  4,8  6,2  -2,9  -1,5  0,1 
EC-average  2,1  1,0  0,7  9,4  9,6  10,6  -0,02  -0,8  -0,7 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 51 revised by national authorities; National budgets; Commission Services. 
a temporary inflationary impulse, expected to abate during 1993 due to weak demand 
and continuing antiinflationary policies. As  shown in graph 7,  a change in priorities 
has  taken  place,  especially  distinct  in  the  Nordic  countries.  Graph  3  gives  some 
information  about  market  expectations6•  Looking  at  the  difference  between  three-
months- and  five-years-bonds,  it  can  be  seen  that  money  markets  advanced 
disinflation in 1989, a year when realised inflation still was accelerating. Norway is an 
exception, because the disinflation process started in 1987,  after the collapse in oil 
prices.  The  1992 numbers  are  of special interest,  since  unemployment has peaked 
without changing markets' expectations. What happens in the years ahead, depends of 
course on current policies. 
6 If  short-term interest rates are higher than long-term rates, the usual interpretation according to the so called 
expectation hypothesis is that markets expect the short-term rates to fall, reflecting falling expected inflation. 
Accordingly, if  the relation between short- and long-term rates is the opposite, markets expect rising inflation. 
7,9 
11,0 
9,3 
9,5 
11;9 l0-
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 52 rwised by national authorities.
3.1 Monetary policies
Austria has been pegging to the German Mark since the late 1970s, and the unequivo-
cal comminnent io tftaitatget has never been questioned by the market; hence the
good record of inflation, and the elimination of risk p1e-it shown i" gaph 4. As
ih.t. are no intentions to change monetary policies, and the Gerrran monetary policy
is projected to remain tight, a"t i"flationary  impulses stemming from monetary policy
must be discounted.
Mastering inflation has been the main concern for the Central Banks even in the
Nordic countries. Struggling with a high and stubborn inflation (graph l): a_credible
exchange rate commitnent would serye as a vehicle for breaking the inflationary
expecta:tions. Before the peg to the ECU7, the Cenfial Banks.used.fiade  weighted
indices. However, having a to"g record of devaluations and accornmodating policies,
the task of overcoming marketi' doubts about such a commitment has proved very
difficult. Recgrring *irner of capital oufflows demonsfiated lack of credibility and
pegging to the ECU proved a successful move, at least in the beginning (qaph-4).
W;rk n-Au*entals worked however against thern" as the interest rate differentials
vis-d-vis the Ecu-rates (gpph 4) suggest. Among other ttrings, markets demanded
more determined fiscal potiCies than the weak govemments could come up with. The
situation was not help.a Uy the economic conjuncture either, especially io Finland
and Sweden" as both iountries experience  the deepest post-war recession.
7 The Nonvegian  krone pegged to the ECU in October 1990, the Swedish krona in tvlay l99l and the Finnish
markka in June 1991.-II-
Graph 4: Long-term interest rate differentials vis-a-vis the Deutche Mark 
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Thus, lack of  credibility and the financial turmoil in the European markets during the 
second half of 1992 exposed the Central Banks of the Nordic countries to  several 
endurance tests whose outcome was that first Finland (8-9/1992), then Sweden (19-
11/1992  )  and  eventually  Norway  (10-12/1992)  abandoned  their  exchange  rate 
commitments,  initiating a period of free  float.  The three  Central Banks have  also 
declared that they have no  intentions to relink their currencies to the ECU in the 
foreseeable future. 
A comparison of the interest rate differentials against the ECU (graph 5) suggests 
that markets were more unwilling to take positions in the Finnish markka than in the 
other two  currencies.  The  market  pressure  on  the  markka  was  always  stronger, 
reflecting not only the weak fundamentals, related to the above mentioned collapse 
of exports and the adverse development in terms of  trade due to the weak dollar, but 
foremost the  equivocal political support for the hard currency policy.  This was  a 
fundamental difference between Finland and the other two Nordic countries, where 
the exchange rate commitment enjoyed unanimous political support. 
Another interestitig feature  in graph 5 is that it shows how events ·in  the ·Firurish 
market always had repercussions to the Swedish market.  The repeated episodes of 
capital outflows in the two markets have been strongly correlated, with the Finnish 
one  usually leading the  Swedish.  It has been asserted that international  investors 
have pooled the Scandinavian markets, so as events in one country induce changes in 
their overall "Scandinavian position".  To the extent this is true,  it can explain the 
quick transmission of financial  crises between Finland and Sweden.  Yet,  even  if 
much of the pressure on the Swedish krona could be explained by external factors, 
one cannot ignore the fact that the interest rate differential vis-a-vis the Ecu shown in 
graph  4  had  some  of its  roots  in  the  domestic  scene.  Uncertainty  about  the 
government's ability to cope with  the soaring fiscal deficit was one reason. Pressure 
stemming from the labour market situation was another. - 12-
Gra  h 5: 3-months' interest rate differentials vis-a-vis the ECU 
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Apparently,  the Norwegian krone was efficiently sheltered by means of the much 
stronger fundamentals, but also because of market thinness. The connection became 
although quite clear when the problems in the EMS-currencies had appeared. 
However,  the  Central  Banks  of Sweden  and  Norway  provided  quite  spectacular 
proofs of  adherence to their exchange rate commitments. They raised market rates to 
historical  highs  in order to  reverse  the  capital  flows.  In response  to  the  Finnish 
decoupling from the Ecu, the Swedish marginal overnight rate, the lending rate to the 
banking system,  rose to the unprecedented level of 75  per cent.  When the almost 
simultaneous turmoil in the European fmancial  markets  showed that this was not 
sufficient, the Riksbank raised it to 500 per cent. Norges Bank acted in a similar way 
after the Swedish floating, sending the marginal overnight rate to 1000 per cent. The 
unavoidable floating decisions in all three cases came when the Central Banks were 
depleted of  exchange reserves. 
Against this background it is not difficult to foresee the stance of monetary policies 
in the Nordic countries, even if  the Central Banks refrained from defming explicit 
intermediate  targets.  A  price  stability norm,  interpreted  as  two  to  three  per cent 
annual  growth  of the  CPI,  seems  to  be  the  ultimate  target  for  their  policies, 
presumably persued by recourse to the interest rate instrument. A combination of  the 
usual  monetary  indicators  such  as  broad  money,  the  slope  of the  yield  curve, 
domestic credit expansion and the time path of  the exchange rates are going to serve 
as a vehicle for the formulation of  the monetary policies. 
The inflationary impulses coming from the currency depreciations and in some cases 
from  higher  income  takes  are  considered  to  be  of minor  importance  for  the 
underlying inflation, as high rates of unemployment are expected to provide labour 
market discipline.  Finland for  example,  has  already  embarked  on a medium term 
income policy package giving zero nominal wage increase for 1993. I) 
-13-
In  conclusion,  monetary policies  based on flexible  exchange rates  is  a  new and 
challenging experience for the Nordic Central Banks.  The fixed exchange rate re-
gime  provided  an  widely  understood  norm  for  the  antiinflationary  policies,  the 
problem  that  haunted  these  economies  for  over  two  decades.  However,  setting 
explicit targets for price stability could prove risky in times of extremely high un-
employment. Inflationary objectives might be subjected to bargaining in the formu-
lation of the policy mix. This risk might be especially high in the Nordic countries, 
which have strong corporatistic traditions. Besides, until recently policies were based 
on the notion that there is a trade off  between inflation and unemployment. 
3.2 Fiscal policies 
Fiscal deficits and public indebtedness in Austria and Norway fluctuate at levels not 
allowing any misgivings about their manageability. However, the soaring deficits in 
Finland and Sweden (table 3 and graph 6) have already reached very high levels and 
these two countries run an obvious risk to fail to m  't the Maastricht criteria. Cur-
rent deficits are in both cases not in line with historical trends and this is especially 
true for Finland, which systematically avoided fiscal deficits (graph 6). Apart from 
country-specific factors, the deteriorating fiscal position during the  1991-1993 pe-
riod can partly be attributed to cyclical factors and partly to the disinflation process 
which affects revenues and expenditure asymmetrically. 
Fiscal developments in Austria are expected to follow recent trends, and it is un-
likely that the fiscal deficit will deviate significantly from its current level. A rea-
sonable projection therefore is that Austria will meet the Maastricht criterion (three 
per cent) by 1995. 
The  Norwegian public  sector also  shows  a  strong  fmancial  position  (graph  6). 
Nevertheless, even if  there should be no reason to cast any doubts about Norway's 
capacity to meet the Maastricht criteria, some comments related to the stance of its 
fiscal policy are justified. 
Given the strongly dualistic nature of the Norwegian economy, with the important 
oil and the gas sector on one side and the rest of the economy on the other, eco-
nomic trends can be better judged if  the erratic influence of  the former is excluded. 
Excluding the oil sector from both the GDP and the public finance aggregates, the 
central government deficit would be 10,5 per cent of  mainland GDP for 1991, rising 
to  11,5  per cent in 1992 and  12,5 per cent in 1993.  Fiscal policies are therefore 
strongly stimulative with respect to the mainland economy. Moreover, excluding a 
calculated permanent income from the oil, amounting to around 7 per cent of the 
mainland GDP, the financial position of the public sector could be considered as 
unsustainable. As a matter of fact, the collapse in oil prices 1986 initiated a period 
of deteriorating public fmances (graph 6), which, after a short period (1986-1989) 
of  fiscal austerity, ended up as an outright deficit. 
Calculations based on reasonable assumptions about oil prices and economic growth 
suggest however that the overall fiscal position will recover as the economy shows 
signs of  upturn, after an extended period of stagnation. Moreover, the impact of  the 
disinflation process on public revenues has abated. 14-
Gra 6: Fiscal Balances in EFTA Countries 198G.1993
Finland
The comfortable tradition of balanced budgets in Finland turned to acute deficits
after 1991. Behind this development is the above mentioned trade shock, which in-
itiated the sharp drop in economic activity. The unusual slippages in the I99l
budget suggest that the events surprised the Finnish govenrment, as revenues were
strongly overestimated and expenditure  strongly underestimateds.  Besides, the in-
itial reaction of the Finnish govemment was based on the false perception that the
crisis was of transitory nature, and the first bundle of measures aimed at just
relieving the effects of a pure demand shock. Thus, public expendittne increased in
order to stimulate the economic activity, and the cyclically adjusted deficit,
initially projected at -0,4 per cent of GDP, became -2,8. The stimulative effect did
not come off, however, due to a sharp increase in private savings as households
and corporations sought to consolidate their financial positions. This was
indicative of the declining public confidence,  but also a result of the disinflation
process which boosted real interest rates.
With greater recognition of the strucfirral problems of the economy, and under
strong pressure on the marlil<a" the Finish government formulated a medium term fi-
nancial program whose spirit is to secure sustainable  recovery through low interest
rates aod -oderate cost developments. Fiscal consolidation has therefore regained
its traditionally strong position among the policy targets, and the overriding restric-
tion in the medium-term budget is that public expenditure in 1995 will not exceed
the level of lggl, in real terms. Consequently,  taking into account the increase in
spending stemming from the mounting public debt, real non-interest  spending  must
faU Uy two to three per cent annually. In line with these medium-term targets, the
govemment announced measures for 1993 implyirg cuts in public consumption  and
ffansfers of the order of two per cent of GDP.
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Source: Commission  Services and National Authorities
8 Revenues were overestimated  by 13 per cent and expenditure underestimated  by 20 per cent.-15-
Graph 7: Inflation and Unemployment in the EFTA(4) Countries 1980-1993 
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It is also clear that the decision to float the markka did not entail any relaxation in 
these efforts, as changes in the pension system and further increases in employers' 
collateral in the social security and unemployment insurance have been notified. 
Finally, an agreement on unchanged nominal wages for 1993 demonstrates a con-
sensus about the stance of  the economic policy. 
Sweden 
A long period of sluggish growth (table 1) combined with more or less automatic 
increases  in  the  major  spending  systems9,  ambitious  reforms  and  increasing 
difficulties  to  raise  the  already  high  tax  burden  (panel  1),  provide  the  major 
explanations of  the fiscal imbalances in Sweden. According to official statements, 
almost half of the current deficit (12 per cent of GDP in 1993) has its origin to 
non-cyclical factors. Moreover, the part of public spending attributed to structural 
factors, such as demography, is expected to enhance its share to total spending in 
the years to come.  As an example, during  1985-1990, one of the best periods in 
macroeconomic  terms  since  the  beginning  of 1970s,  transfers  to  households 
increased by 54 per cent in fixed prices, whereas real GDP grew by 12,9 per cent. 
Indicative  of the  inherent  difficulties  to  control  public  spending  are  also  the 
fmdings that in spite of the fact that the labour market was overheated during this 
period, fiscal policy was stimulative, a fact that tends to be concealed behind the 
fiscal surpluses (graph 6). 
The  fast  rising  transfers  have  drawn  the  interest  of both  the  former  socialist 
government and it's center-right successor for several reasons.  First,  most of the 
public insurance systems are inefficiently funded, with the national supplementary 
pension system being the most threatening example in the long-run. Second, there 
is  a strong redistributive leaning in their construction,  which makes the linkage 
between individual participation and individual benefits very weak. For example, 
the  deficiently funded unemployment insurance is believed to have undermined 
labour  market  discipline,  while  the  strongly  redistributive  pension  system  has 
probably  contributed  to  the  traditionally  extremely  low  rate  of the  Swedish 
household saving.  Generally, the inadequate correspondence between productive 
efforts  and  individual  standard  of living,  stemming  from  the  generous  welfare 
system,  has  been blamed as  one  of the  major reasons  for  the  sluggish  growth 
during the two latest decades. 
A major tax reform was implemented in  1990, with the intention to improve the 
supply side of the economy without diminishing the tax revenues•o.  The general 
notion however seems to be that the reform was insufficiently funded.  Since the 
reform came into effect at the beginning of  the economic downturn it is difficult to 
separate the cyclical from the structural factors of the subsequent revenue losses. 
The  sharp rise  in household savings provides the most striking example  in this 
respect. But whatever the exact explanation behind the rapid deterioration of the 
9 According to official sources, e.g. the latest budget proposal, 85 per cent of cenrtal government spending is 
beyond the discretionary power of  the government. 
10 Among other things it reduced the marginal rates of the direct taxes, especially on the highest income levels 
(from over 80 per cent to 50 per cent in the course of  three years).  The revenue losses would be counterbalanced 
by higher rates and broedened bases of indirect taxes. -17-
fiscal position might be, the alanning development made a total reconsideration of 
the public sector activities unavoidable. 
Several packages of  corrective measures have seen the light since early 1991, some 
of  them aiming to prevent the anticipated deterioration in public finances and some 
of them as a  desperate effort to restore confidence to the failed  exchange rate 
nonn.  The  basic  approach  has  been  to  curb  public  spending  in  a  way  that 
strengthens the supply side of the economy.  Thus,  less generous unemployment 
and health insurance, increased fees for public services and reduced transfers and 
subsidies have been decided,  along with reductions in some  "growth impeding" 
taxes such as the turnover tax on securities and capital income. 
The rapid cyclical weakness of the economy however, imposed severe constrains 
on policy  priorities,  and  some  of the  tax  decreases  have  been  suspended  or 
deferred. So, previously announced reductions in e.g the general V.A.T. rate from 
25 to 22 per cent and the capital income from the current 30 per cent rate to 25 per 
cent  have  been  cancelled.  Cross-party  agreements  aiming  at  improving  the 
competitiveness  of  the  economy,  e.g.  susbstantial  cuts  in  the  employees' 
contributions to social security funds, also have been fmanced by increases in both 
direct and indirect (mostly environmental) taxes. As the decision to float the krona 
radically changed the  conditions  on which  decisions  have  been based on,  one 
expects that the coming budget proposal (January 1993) will demark a return to 
measures  that  have  sustainable  long-run  effects,  and  the  exact  status  of the 
previous agreements is not clear. 
Current forecasts hint at negative growth and continuing deterioration of  the fiscal 
position  in  1993,  as  economic  recovery  is  not foreseen  before  1994.  So,  the 
medium term  situation remains  gloomy,  unless  the  strong  improvement  in the 
competitive  position  leads  to  a  rate  of growth  that  clearly  exceeds  previous 
forecasts.  Current official scenarios foreshadow a fiscal deficit of the order of 6 
per cent of GDP in 1997 and the soaring public debt moves quickly towards the 
level of  90 per cent of GDP during the same period. Clearly, the ambition to meet 
the EMU-criteria calls for more radical measures. 
3.3 Financial Crisis in the Nordic Countries 
An additional problem currently haunting the Nordic countries is the fmancial dis-
tress of  the banking sector, showed in table 4. Substantial credit losses emerged al-
ready in 1987 in Norway and surfaced in Finland and Sweden in 1990. Despite the 
chronological difference,  the  origin and the extent of the problem seems to be 
quite  similar.  The  major  explanations  can  be  found  behind  an  unfortunate 
combination of credit and exchange market deregulations along with radical tax 
reforms. 
Credit market deregulations  came during the first half of the  1980s,  a  time  of 
strong growth and solid income prospects. Consequently, they led to a very strong 
credit expansion as the supply side immediately responded to the strong demand. -18-
Moreover, the demand side was propelled by extremely low (negative up to 1987) 
after  tax  real  interest  rates,  owing  to  both  high  tax  deductability  of interest 
expenditure (the tax reforms came in late 1980s) and low nominal interest rates 
due to exchange controls (also abolished in late  1980s).  Surprisingly, neither of 
these reforms seems to have been discounted in the behaviour of either side of  the 
credit market, even if  they were quite predictable. 
Table 4: Financial Crisis in the Nordic Countries; Selected Statistics 
1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 
Credit  Finland  20,0  30,6  16,6  10,5  1,1  -4 0* 
'  growth  Norway  15,7  9,3  7,4  4,1  4,1  -2 4* 
'  Sweden  15,9  31,5  25,7  16,6  -1,5  -6 9* 
' 
Credit  Finland  0,7  0,8  1,6  3 0*** 
'  losses  Norway  2,1  2,5  3,9  2 5** 
'  Sweden  0,2  0,7  2,9  4 4** 
' 
Savings  Finland  3,5  0,4  2,1  3,6  6,0  n.a. 
ratio  Norway  -6,1  -2,6  1,2  2,0  5,0  8,0 
Sweden  -3 4 
' 
-5  1 
' 
-4,6  -1,0  1,9  3,1 
Household  Finland  62,0  82,7  83,8  81,9  78,5 
indebtness  Norway  147,0  151,3  154,0  147,5  142,4 
ratio  Sweden  120,2  134,5  134,2  125,9  116,7 
•  12 months average m July 1992;  •• FirSt etght months 1992;  ••• Estimate for 1992 provtded by the Bank of 
Finland. 
Source: National Authorities and Commission Services. 
The problems appeared first in Norway in 1988, after the fall in oil prices  1986 
and  the  tax  reform  of 1987.  The  former  weakened  dramatically  the  income 
prospects of the private sector, whereas the latter curtailed significantly the tax 
deductibility of  interest expenditure. As a consequence, the relative prices between 
borrowing and saving changed dramatically. Similar events took place in Finland 
and Sweden about three years later.  First,  the tax reforms  of the beginning of 
1990s considerably reduced tax deductibility of  interest expenditure and this came 
at the same time as a significant drop in the income prospects of  the private sector 
occurred. Second, the almost simultaneous dismantling of  exchange controls led to 
higher nominal interest rates at the same time as the governments embarked on 
disinflationary policies. These two changes together boosted real interest rates and 
triggered a considerable drop in credit demand, with a commensurate increase in 
the savings ratios.  Asset prices, especially for real estate, plunged to levels that 
made much of the previous rather speculative and highly leveraged investment in 
real assets unprofitable.  The subsequent credit losses made several banks in the 
three countries not only unprofitable in the short run, but also insolvent. - 19-
The policy response, starting from a case to case treatment, has gradually become 
more  systematic.  Comprehensive guarantees aiming at restoring depositors'  and 
other asset holders' confidence have been issued by the governments and quite 
elaborate restructuring plans have emerged as well. Outright financial support also 
has reached non-negligible levels which, besides from adding to the already high 
borrowing requirements for the three governments also raised the crucial question 
of public  ownership of the banking  sector.  In Norway for  example,  where  the 
support hitherto amounts to 3,6 per cent of GDP,  the state has become a major 
owner  of the  banking  system.  The  Finnish  government  tries  to  avoid  direct 
ownership due to the attendant moral hazard problems, by issuing loans involving 
only an option for the government to swap loans with shares in the future.  The 
Swedish government, which has been trying to privatize the plagued state-owned 
Nordbanken  11, has declared that financial support is granted on purely commercial 
principles. 
Whatever the remedies to the financial crisis might be, there is an obvious risk that 
the  Nordic  economies  have  come  to  a  very  disadvantageous  situation.  The 
currently tight credit market may, besides from contributing to a deepening of the 
current recession, also prove unable to financially support an economic recovery, 
when improved international conditions boost the demand for credit. 
11 Nordbanken is one of the major Swedish banks. -20-
4 STRUCTURAL POLICIES 
Inflation in the long-run depends not only on macroeconomic polices, but also on 
the overall functioning of domestic markets. Competitive pressure and incentives 
to exploit or create profitable opportunities are of crucial importance for produc-
tivity growth. On the other hand, rigidities stemming from regulations, the wage 
formation system, taxation and the size of the public sector undermine an econ-
omy's flexibility, strength and competitiveness in the long-run. The brief review of 
these aspects in this section suggests that several reforms  are  necessary, if  the 
EFTA(  4) countries want to reduce the costs of  participation in the EMU. 
4.1 Public sector and taxation 
Most of  the public services are not distributed through markets and the production 
costs are financed by taxes. Lack of  a price mechanism means that one of  the basic 
tools for judging efficiency is absent, while heavy taxation and subsidies are dis-
tortive per se.  According to traditional measures of public sector size shown in 
panel I, one can suspect that the Swedish economy must suffer from severe struc-
tural problems,  as  the use of 60 per cent of its  GDP is  subjected to  decisions 
within the public sector. As a matter of  fact, the Swedish public sector is the high-
est in the OECD area. 
Recognising the negative influence of the huge public  sector on efficiency and 
growth, Swedish governments have been trying several ways to remove the most 
negative elements from the system.  Traditional remedies like privatisation,  con-
tracting out of complementary services such as cleaning, and enhanced possibili-
ties for private competition in the provision of  services have been in the agenda for 
a long time, but weak asset markets retard the privatisation process. An interesting 
and popular trend is  currently the  decoupling  of production from  distribution. 
Trying to promote efficiency in production without diminishing the availability of 
certain public services, it has been suggested that production of e.g. health, educa-
tion, transports could be carried out by competing private and public entities. Po-
litical control will still be exercised on the distribution of  the resulting output how-
ever, meaning that the public will still have free (or almost free) access to these 
services, implying that production costs will be financed by taxes. Thus, the new 
system does not solve the problems of the heavy taxation, and this can be espe-
cially problematic in the future as the extent the ongoing economic integration in-
creases tax-base mobility, setting this way effective upper limits to tax rates. 
Recent tax reforms in all the EFTA(  4) countries have made their tax systems less 
distortive, and have brought them more in line with EC practices. The guide-lines 
in these parallel reforms have been similar: Lower marginal rates on direct taxes 
and more reliance on VAT. 
4.2 Labour markets 
The traditional way of correcting competitiveness by exchange rate changes will 
be closed after participation in the EMU. Moreover, the possibilities for the public -21-
sectors to absorb unemployment will be severely curtailed. Therefore, much of  the 
impressive  unemployment  nwnbers  or the  high  real  wage  flexibility  estimates 
shown in table 5 are not quite relevant for a situation in when exchange rate ad-
justments are not possible. It is not unlikely that the recent rise in unemployment 
in the Nordic countries can be related to the new orientation in economic policies, 
at least prior to the recent depreciation. If so, the shifts shown in graph 7 are of 
structural nature, suggesting that average future unemployment will probably ex-
ceed its historical levels.  It also means that flexibility in nominal wages will be 
more compelling in the new environment. 
Assuming low and stable inflation under the EMU,  nominal wage flexibility is of 
key importance for the competitive position of the participating countries and for 
the Community as a whole. Since such flexibility cannot be provided overnight, it 
must be a part of  the program of  real convergence. From this point of  view, there-
cent depreciations of  the Nordic currencies can be considered as time-inconsistent 
policies, to the extent the temporary relief induces a more relaxed attitude towards 
the imperative of  nominal flexibility. 
Table S: Selected Labour Market statistics, 1991 
Austria  Finland  Norway  Sweden 
Participation  67,7  76,9  79,8  83,9 
rate 
-Female  55,4  72,9  72,6  80,1 
NAIRUl)  n.a.  4,0  3,5  2,2 
Long-term  unem- 15,8  19,0  17,0  8,0 
ployment 
Long  run  real 
wage flexibility2) 
-0 8 
' 
-0,5  n.a.  -1,.4 
Wage  formation  Centralised  Centralised  Centralised  Centralised 
system 
1) Non Accelerating inflation rate of  Unemployment;  2) Semi-elasticity of  real wages changes with respect to 
the rate of  unemployment. 
Source: OECD, Country Studies. 
4.3 Subsidies 
While subsidies in general is a minor problem, subsidies in the agricultural sector 
are  quite  problematic  for  two  reasons.  First,  the  degree  of subsidization,  on 
average, has been much higher in these countries than in the EC. Second, the EEA 
treaty exempted this particular sector from harmonization to the regulations of the 
EC. Only the fact that the governments of  the EFTA countries wanted to maintain 
their discretionary power in this area indicates that important national goals are -22-
hidden behind their agricultural policies.  In effect,  a mixture of environmental, 
social, regional and defence objectives, along with assumed positive externalities 
to other sectors such as tourism, is encountered in different proportions in each 
country, and the result is shown in table 6. 
Table 6: Size and subsidization of  the agricultural sector, 1990 
PSEa) 
CSEb) 
Employment 
Austria 
46% 
-4~/o 
8,0% 
Finland 
73% 
-71% 
Norway 
78% 
-65% 
Sweden 
59% 
-65% 
3,6% 
47% 
-41% 
a) Producer Subsidy Equivalence; OECD measure of  the share of  subsidies or subsidy equivalents to the 
value of  sector output 
b) Consumer Subsidy Equivalent; The total value of  transfers as a percentage of  total value of  consumption. 
Source: OECD, Agricultural policies, markets and trade, Paris 1992. 
Even if  EC 's common agricultural policy does not constitute the best point of de-
parture for economic reasoning, simple alignment with the more transparent sys-
tem prevailing in the Community might be an improvement. The single objective 
of attaining a stable development of sectoral income, basically by means of price 
support and external protection, is less extensive and probably less distortive than 
the existing national systems. 
Sweden has taken a first step in reforming its agricultural policies in 1991, by de-
ciding to reduce the subsidies and relax the protection from import. It seems that 
these measures are part of a more comprehensive package, because the Swedish 
government announced plans to dismantle most of the regulations in the medium 
~erm. Similar reforms have not been notified by the other governments. 
4.4 Malfunctioning internal markets 
According to the EEA treaty, all the EFTA countries have to align their competi-
tion policies to EC rules after a period of  three years. More exact, EC regulations 
will replace national legislation at the beginning of 1996. This is indeed an area of 
much-needed changes in the EFTA(4) countries, because a substantial amount of 
(mostly anecdotal) evidence suggests that the market mechanism has been severely 
squeezed. Imprecise legal and institutional arrangements are responsible to some 
extent, but it looks like that most of the violations against the market mechanism 
have their origin to an extremely tolerant stance against practices that effectively 
utilize the borderland between what is lawful and illegal. Idiosyncratic views about 
market efficiency seems to underpin this attitude, with further support from long  · 
traditions of  corporatistic ruling. -23-
Deviations from market efficiency are difficult to  substantiate quantitatively, but 
the  single  observation that consumer prices  for  both  tradable. and  non-tradable 
goods are notably higher in these countries than in equally developed EC-countries 
can be taken as indirect evidence.  Consumer goods were for example around 40 
per cent higher than EC-average in 198S in the EFT  A( 4) countries, with small dif-
ferences between them. Even if  a small portion of  this difference can be explained 
by market segmentation due to topographical and geographical idiosyncrasies, the 
major part must attributed to lack of  competition. 
Numerous official reports reveal that cartelization. market dominance,  and direct 
regulations  of markets  are  frequently  encountered in these  countries.  The  well 
documented existence of  price lists, usually issued by branch organisations, market 
share agreements either in form of carving the market into distinct areas or by fix-
ing  quantities produced or selled,  exclusive sales  agreements  of specific  trade-
marks, non-entrance agreements of  previous owners in case of takeovers and even 
joint tendering in procurement, provide  sufficient evidence that cartels hold do-
mestic markets under tight control. 
The effects of cartels are well known. Prices tend to be higher than necessary and 
more  rigid,  as  the  convenient market position allows  both higher mark-ups  and 
price smoothing. Another effect is that foreign suppliers find it easy to apply price 
discrimination  in  cartelized  markets.  For  example,  import  prices  for  identical 
goods are more than seven per cent higher in Austria than in Germany, and the dif-
ference becomes ten per cent if  we compare with Netherlands. 
Vertical integration based either on ownership or on well controlled distribution 
networks  is  also  widespread in all the  EFT  A(  4) countries.  Three  to  five  major 
wholesalers or distribution chains control 80 to 90 per cent of sectoral sales,  de-
pending on which country or which sector one chooses to look at.  Construction, 
food  processing and consumer goods  are  found  among  the  most  vertically inte-
grated sectors. The pulp and paper industry holds a distinct position in the Scandi-
navian countries, as it is integrated both with forestry and construction material in-
dustries.  · 
Comprehensive systems of  price regulations give also the impression that the price 
mechanism has been one of  the major tools to achieve social goals. Items exposed 
to price regulations of  one kind or another constitute a basket whose weight stands 
.for over one third of the CPI basket. Price regulations are most frequent in trans-
ports and communications, housing rents, energy, culture, food, tobacco and bev-
erages12.  Since  price  regulations  are  in most  cases  encountered  in  sectors  of 
"particular importance",  they usually  are  only  a component  of an  intervention 
package, other parts being subsidies and entry controls. 
Unusual difficulties for market entry is another interesting feature. A quite inflex-
ible system of  licensing and franchising has provided effective protection to exist-
ing suppliers, whilst extensive use of needs-testing,  especially at the local level, 
has in essence given discretionary power to  authorities to prevent "unnecessary" 
12 Among interesting peculiarities one can mention that excessive rebates (over 3%) and pricing below the cost 
are still prohibited in Austria. Comparative advertising with respect to prices was also banned until recently. -24-
competition. Thus, one can easily find local monopolies in areas like energy13  and 
transportation. Rigid use of  town plans has also contributed to restricted competi-
tion, as localities for shops are limited and shopping centers are usually controlled 
by construction companies,  distribution chains  and wholesalers,  often intercon-
nected by cross-ownership.  Needles to say that access to markets where public 
monopolies prevail, such as energy production, postal services, air traffic and tele-
communications has, until recently, been very restricted. 
Constraints on foreign ownership of  various types of assets have been working in 
the same direction. Upper limits on the share of foreign participation in industry, 
prohibitions for ownership of land and/or real estate, the right allotted to finns to 
issue shares with limited voting power have hindered foreign direct investment and 
sheltered managers from hostile take-overs. 
4.4.1 The Institutional Set-up 
At heart of the problem seems have been the strong corporatist element in the 
EFTA countries' political life, and the attendant idiosyncratic ways of  viewing the 
market mechanism and conducting economic policies. Thus, the institutional set-
up in most areas has a strong corporatist leaning which, whilst it served as a plank 
to underpin major reform programs and good macroeconomic performance in the 
past, also favoured an institutional framework in which the social parties keep tight 
reins  on market forces.  So,  instead of invigorating  competition  as  a  means  to 
achieve good market performance,  one tried to defend a vaguely defined public 
interest by banning only abuse of  market power. This concept has been pivotal of 
the legislation in all the EFT  A(  4) countries, and had the adverse effect to promote 
cartellization, tacit collusions, market dominance etc, because they have not been 
prohibited per se. So, the burden of proving what is detrimental to public interest 
has been reverse to economic thinking, which also hampered the work of the su-
pervising authorities. 
4.4.2 Radical reforms are coming 
The growing interest to revitalise the supply side of  their economies and the recent 
EFTA-EC agreement have imparted a new impetus to the competition policies in 
the EFTA(  4) countries. So, a strong wave of deregulations and rapid harmoniza-
tion to EC rules, combined with markedly strengthened supervisory authorities are 
to emerge in the next two years. 
Sweden has already started this process and the Parliament adopted a new Com-
petition Act in November 1992. The new Act is in every relevant respect identical 
to EC rules and will take effect on 1 July 1993. Promotion of competition per se 
rather than abuse of market position is the new overriding objective, prohibiting 
thereby all forms of collusive behaviour. Agreements or mergers can be allowed 
only if  they pass a "competition test", implying that special cases can be tolerated 
only if  it shows that competition will not suffer. 
13 Norway has recently deregulated the energy sector. -25-
Similar signals come even from the other countries. The new Competition Law in 
Finland,  which took effect in September  1992,  prohibits horizontal  cartels  but 
maintains its philosophical bias towards the old "abuse principle". The government 
has also announced the preparation of a bill, expected to be submitted to the Par-
liament during  1993, aiming at removing restrictions on foreign ownership.  The 
Austrian Cartel Law is currently subjected to a comprehensive overhaul, with a 
view to increasing the possibilities of  initiating infringement procedures and to in-
troduce merger controls. However, a strengthening in the enforcement of existing 
rules by the Cartel Commission has been reported.  Yet,  another deviation from 
previous practices in all these countries is the shift from moral suasion to consid-
erable legal and economic sanctions in case of  infringement. 
5 A FINAL COMMENT 
The expected costs and benefits of joining the EMU are probably different for 
each one of the EFTA(  4) countries. Relinquishing the exchange rate requires an 
adjustment period for the three Nordic countries while Austria has already gained 
a credible fixed exchange rate regime vis-a-vis the Deutsche Mark. Unfortunately, 
the costs of achieving low inflation and nominal flexibility occur in a period of 
deep recession, at least in Finland and Sweden, with the additional constraint of 
fiscal consolidation.  Moreover, the time schedule for the EMU does not allow any 
short-term deviations from the adjustment process. However, the macroeconomic 
policies adopted by the governments in recent past suggest that,  in spite of the 
adverse economic conditions, a shift in priorities has taken place. 
Undoubtedly, the timing of  the adjustment undermines the popularity of  the idea to 
join the EMU.  Even if such tendencies have  come to the  surface in many EC 
countries, the risk that public sentiment will be more affected by the restrictive 
convergence policies than by the underlying EMU ideas must be higher in these 
countries. This is because the provisions of the treaty are completely external to 
them, in the sense that they had no participation and, of course, no influence on 
the preparation of it. It is to be hoped that, in spite of these considerations, the 
outcome of  the referenda which are due in the course of 1994 will be positive. -26-
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